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i Versus we: the eFFects oF selF-construal  
leVel on diVersity
carina J. Wiekens and diederik A. stapel
Tilburg University
In two studies it is demonstrated that people’s self-construal level may 
influence the extent to which they spontaneously produce divergent 
ideas. In study 1, it is shown that construing the self at a personal level 
(“I”) induces the motivation to be independent, alone, and different, 
whereas construing the self at a social level (“we”) induces the motivation 
to be accepted, together, and to conform. In study 2, it is shown 
that--in the absence of explicit instructions to be different--personal 
self-construals lead to more diversity (e.g., drawing a golf cart as an 
example of a motor vehicle), whereas social self-construals lead to less 
diversity (e.g., drawing a car as an example of a motor vehicle). Possible 
implications for brainstorm sessions in groups and other group-based 
ventures in which diversity is desired are discussed.
Why do individual members of a group often come up with more unique and di-
vergent ideas when working alone than when working together as a group? This 
question has troubled many researchers, and not in the least those who study the 
often found productivity losses when people are brainstorming in groups (e.g., 
Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991; Paulus, Larey, & Ortega, 1995). Since researchers 
started their search for reasons that individuals in groups seem to produce less di-
vergent ideas, many suggestions have been offered, including “production block-
ing” (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2003), “social anxious-
ness” (Camacho & Paulus, 1995), and “conforming to norms” (Adarves-Yorno, 
Postmes, & Haslam, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the idea that social anxiety, production blocking, and confor-
mance to norms may repress the expression of divergent ideas, in the current ar-
ticle we will explore an additional mechanism that may explain why people in 
groups often come up with less unique, divergent ideas than when working alone. 
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More specifically, we will argue that construing the self as an individual (“I”) or as 
part of a group (“we”) may determine whether people are prone to, respectively, 
think “different” (and may therefore come up with unique, divergent ideas) or 
“similar” (and may therefore come up with common, convergent ideas). 
sELF-consTruAL LEvEL ThEory
A basic premise of self-construal level theory is that people have distinctive lev-
els of self-representation (e.g., Brewer, & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 
1999). Depending on culture and context, people may represent themselves in re-
lationship with others (social self-construals) or as individuals (personal self-con-
struals). Cross-cultural research, for example, has shown that due to socialization 
processes, people from Western countries construe themselves at a more indepen-
dent, personal level (in terms of “I” and individual differences) than people from 
Eastern countries, who construe themselves at a more interdependent, social level 
(in terms of “we” and inter-individual similarities), (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 
1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 2003). Whereas members of individualistic (West-
ern) countries learn to place emphasis on characteristics that make them unique 
and separate from others, members of collectivistic (Eastern) countries learn to 
place emphasis on characteristics that make them similar and well-suited to main-
tain harmony with others (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000).
Although substantial inter-cultural differences have been found, Gardner, Ga-
briel, and Lee (1999) demonstrated that depending on context, individual mem-
bers of both cultures are able to construe themselves at different levels. More spe-
cifically, Gardner and colleagues (1999) have shown that priming a social identity 
(“we-priming” by means of encircling the words “we,” “us,” “our” and “ours” in 
a text) in members of an individualistic country produced a shift towards more 
social values (e.g., belongingness, friendships, family safety), whereas priming a 
personal identity (“I-priming” by means of encircling the words “I,” “me,” “my,” 
and “mine” in a text) in members of a collectivistic country produced a shift to-
wards more individualistic values (e.g., freedom, independence, choosing one’s 
own goals). Thus, depending on context, individuals within each culture seem to 
be able to construe themselves flexibly, which may subsequently determine which 
“basic motivation” (autonomy, independence or belonging, interdependence) will 
guide their behavior (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Gardner et al., 1999).
Construing the self as an autonomous being or as a social being may exert in-
fluence on the way social information is being processed. As Stapel and Koomen 
(2001) showed, the level at which people represent themselves (“I” versus “we”) 
may influence whether people engage in contrastive or assimilative social com-
parisons (see also, Kühnen & Hannover, 2000). More specifically, they showed that 
I-priming activates a differentiation mindset (“I am different from others”), whereas 
we-priming activates an integration mindset (“I am similar to others”). When per-
sonal self-construals (“I”) were accessible, participants emphasized self-distinc-
tiveness and were prone to contrast the self away from others, whereas when so-
cial self-construals (“we”) were accessible, participants emphasized similarities 
and were prone to assimilate the self to others. Hence, people’s self-construals 
influence the way social information is being processed.
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Likewise, Van Baaren, Horgan, Chartrand, and Dijkmans (2004) have argued 
that “information processing styles,” which they operationalized as a focus on re-
lationships between components (interdependent processing style) versus a fo-
cus on individual components (independent processing style), may influence the 
reaction to social information. They showed that an interdependent processing 
style fosters mimicry, whereas an independent processing style represses mimicry. 
Based on these results, Van Baaren and colleagues (2004) concluded that people’s 
cognitive style (either chronically available or temporarily induced) may increase 
or decrease synchronization of one’s behavior with the behavior of an interaction 
partner, which may increase or decrease interconnectedness. 
Interesting for the current argument is that a “state of mind” exerts influence on 
the way social information is being processed. A similarity mindset (or interdepen-
dent cognitive thinking style) may focus attention on similarities and, by doing so, 
increases interconnectedness, whereas a differentiation mindset (or independent 
cognitive thinking style) may focus attention on differences and decreases inter-
connectedness. In the current article we will take this research one step further 
and explore the influence these different self-construal levels have on relatively 
non-social behaviors. If self-construal levels are indeed related to specific mindsets, 
self-construal effects may not be confined to the processing of social information, 
but may as well influence the way non-social information is being processed.
More specifically, we expect that personal self-construals will lead not only to 
differentiating the self from others, but also to more divergent (non-social) be-
havior. Conversely, we expect that the activation of social self-construals will lead 
not only to assimilating the self to others, but, more generally, to more convergent 
behavior. 
In summary, in two experiments we will test whether self-construal level affects 
people’s motivation and behavior. Our hypotheses are that I-priming activates 
the motivation to be “autonomous” and “different,” and thus increases divergent 
behavior, whereas we-priming increases the motivation to be similar, and thus 
increases convergent behavior. 
study 1
The first study was designed to examine the influence of I-priming and we-prim-
ing on motivation. Our hypotheses are that personal self-construals will lead to the 
motivation to be different, whereas social self-construals will lead to a motivation 
to be similar.
METhod
Participants. A total of 61 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a three between-subjects factorial design (priming condition: I, we, 
neutral).
Materials and Procedure. All participants, regardless of condition, received a word 
search task. This priming task was modeled after Brewer and Gardner (1996; see 
also Stapel & Koomen, 2001). In the priming conditions, participants were in-
structed to circle all first-person pronouns that appeared in a text. In the I-priming 
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condition, all of the pronouns referred to I, me, my, and mine. In the we-priming 
condition, these pronouns were replaced by we, us, our. In the control condition the 
pronouns were replaced by the letter combinations abc and xyz.
Next, participants received a questionnaire entitled “motivation.” Participants 
were asked to indicate to what extent they were motivated to be independent, 
different, and alone, to be together, accepted and to conform (all items were mea-
sured on a scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Correla-
tion analyses showed that the motivations to be accepted and to conform were 
highly correlated. Therefore, we calculated a compound score (Cronbach’s α = 
.71). Similarly, we calculated a compound score for the motivations to be inde-
pendent and to be different (Cronbach’s α = .70). After filling out the motivation 
questionnaire, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.
rEsuLTs And dIscussIon
We conducted a three between-subjects analysis of variance on the motivation-
questionnaire (I-priming, we-priming, neutral). This ANOVA yielded a significant 
effect for the motivation to be independent/different, F(2, 59) = 13.28, p < .001, to 
be accepted/conform, F(2, 59) = 11.26, p < . 001, to be together, F(2, 59) = 13.38, p < 
.001, and to be alone, F(2, 59) = 10.02, p < .001. 
Planned comparison analyses showed, consistent with hypotheses, that partici-
pants whose personal self was activated were more motivated to be independent/
different (M = 5.3, SD = .82) than participants in the control condition (M = 4.7, 
SD = .87), t(59) = 2.80, p < .01. Participants in the control condition (M = 4.7, SD = 
.87), in turn, were more motivated to be independent/different than participants 
whose social self was activated (M = 3.9, SD = .73), t(59) = 3.00, p < .01.
Planned comparison analyses on the motivation to be accepted/conform 
showed, consistent with hypotheses, that participants whose personal self was 
activated, were less motivated to be accepted (M = 3.2, SD = .98) than participants 
in the control condition (M = 3.9, SD = .77), t(59) = -2.70, p < .01. Participants in the 
control condition, in turn, were less motivated to be accepted/conform than par-
ticipants whose social self was activated (M = 4.7, SD =.99), t(59) = -2.66, p < .01.
Planned comparison analyses showed, consistent with hypotheses, that partici-
pants whose personal self was activated, were less motivated to be together (M = 
3.0, SD = 1.04) than participants in the control condition (M = 4.4, SD = 1.57), t(59) 
= -1.37, p < .01. Participants in the control condition, in turn, were less motivated 
to be together than participants whose social self was activated (M = 5.3, SD = .91), 
t(59) = -.90, p < .06.
Conversely, and consistent with hypotheses, participants whose personal self 
was activated were more motivated to be alone (M = 5.0, SD = .1.15) than partici-
pants in the control condition (M = 4.2, SD = 1.32), t(59) = .90, p < .05. Participants 
in the control condition, in turn, were more motivated to be alone than participants 
whose social self was activated (M = 3.0, SD = 1.44), t(59) = 1.15, p < .01.
In summary, consistent with hypotheses we found that participants whose per-
sonal self was activated by I-priming were more motivated to be independent/
different and to be alone, and less motivated to be accepted/to conform and to be 
together. Conversely, participants whose social self was activated by we-priming 
were more motivated to be accepted/to conform and to be together, and less moti-
vated to be independent/different and alone.
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These results show that, consistent with previous research (e.g., Gardner et al., 
1999), participants whose social self is activated, are motivated to be interconnect-
ed with other people, whereas participants whose personal self is activated are 
motivated to be autonomous and independent. Moreover, this study is the first to 
demonstrate that activating the personal self increases the motivation to be differ-
ent. In the next study we will measure whether personal or social self-construals 
are able to influence divergent thinking. 
study 2
The second study was designed to examine the influence of self-construal level 
on divergent thinking, and, more specifically, on the spontaneous expression of 
divergent ideas. We expect participants whose personal self is activated, to pro-
duce more divergent ideas and products than participants whose social self is ac-
tivated. 
To measure the degree in which people produce “divergent products,” we asked 
them to draw a “motor vehicle” and to give an example of three categories (furni-
ture, tools, and clothing). We expect participants whose personal self is activated, 
to draw less common motor vehicles (e.g., less cars), and to come up with more 
unusual examples of the three categories given, whereas we expect the opposite to 
happen in participants whose social self is activated.
METhod
Participants. A total of 107 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to 
the conditions of a three between-subjects factorial design (priming condition: I, 
we, neutral).
Materials and Procedure. All participants, regardless of condition, received the 
same priming task as was used in Study 1. Next, participants were asked to draw 
a motor vehicle on a blank piece of paper. Subsequently, they were asked to name 
one example of the following categories: furniture, tools, and clothing. After each 
category, one line was left open for a response. After filling out the questionnaire, 
participants were thanked and debriefed.
rEsuLTs And dIscussIon
Results showed that 72% of all drawings depicted a car, and 14% of all drawings 
a motorcycle. Other drawings depicted (school-)buses, trains, tanks, trucks, golf 
carts, and agricultural vehicles. These latter examples each constituted less than 
3% of the total amount of drawings. To measure the extent to which participants 
produced divergent products, we coded drawings of a car as 1 (common), whereas 
we coded other drawings as 2 (unusual).1 
1. Considering a drawing of a motorcycle as a common drawing (and therefore creating two 
categories: 1 = car or motorcycle, and 2 = other motor vehicles) did not change the results.
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We conducted a Chi-square test to examine whether participants in the priming condi-
tions differed in their responses. This test produced a highly significant effect (χ2 = 
12.05, df = 2, p = < .01). In the I-priming condition participants drew relatively 
more “other vehicles” (N = 16, 46% of total amount of drawings within condition) 
than participants in the control condition (N = 11, 30%). Participants in the control 
condition, in turn, drew relatively more other vehicles than participants in the 
we-priming condition (N = 3, 9%). In other words, in line with our hypotheses, 
we found that participants whose personal self was activated produced more di-
vergent drawings than participants in the control condition, whereas participants 
whose social self was activated, produced less divergent drawings.
Examples of Furniture. Results showed that the two most often given examples 
of furniture are a couch (N = 42) and a chair (N = 30), which together constituted 
67% of all mentioned examples. Other examples were closets (N = 10), tables (N = 
10), sofa’s (N = 6), bookcases (N = 3), beds (N = 3), bar stools (N = 2), and a divan 
(N = 1), which each constituted less than 10% of the total amount of mentioned 
examples. We coded a couch and a chair as 1 (common), and other examples as 2 
(unusual). A Chi-square test on the participants’ responses showed a significant 
effect (χ2 = 7.86, df = 2, p = < .05). Consistent with hypotheses, we found that in 
the I-priming condition, relatively more participants gave a divergent example of 
furniture (N = 17, 49% of all given examples within condition) than in the control 
condition (N = 12, 32%). In the control condition, relatively more participants gave 
an unusual example (N = 12, 32%) than in the we-priming condition (N = 6, 17%). 
In other words, participants in the we-priming condition were least divergent in 
their responses, whereas participants in the I-priming condition were most diver-
gent.
Examples of Tools. Results showed that a hammer was the most often given ex-
ample (N = 73, 68%). Among other examples were screw drivers (N = 11), axes (N 
= 3), saws (N = 3), pincers (N = 2), a drill (N = 1), and a chisel (N = 1), which each 
constituted less than 10% of the total amount of examples. We coded a hammer as 
1 (common), and other examples as 2 (unusual). A Chi-square test indicated a sig-
nificant effect (χ2 = 11.25, df = 2, p = < .01). Consistent with hypotheses, we found 
that in the I-priming condition, relatively more participants gave an unusual ex-
ample of a tool (N = 18, 51% of all given examples within condition) than in the 
control condition (N = 11, 30%). In the control condition, in turn, relatively more 
participants gave an unusual example (N = 11, 30%) than in the we-priming condi-
tion (N = 5, 14%).
Examples of Clothes. Results showed that the most often mentioned examples 
were trousers (N = 39, 37% of all given examples), skirts (N = 19, 18%), and jump-
ers (N = 19, 18%). Among other examples were dresses (N = 9, 9%), jackets (N = 5, 
5%), shirts (N = 2, 2%), socks (N = 2, 2%), pyjamas (N = 1, 1%), a suit (N = 1, 1%), 
and a jogging suit (N = 1, 1%), which each constituted less than 10% of the total 
amount of examples. We coded trousers, skirts, and jumpers as 1 (common), and 
other examples as 2 (unusual). A Chi-square test indicated a significant effect (χ2 = 
8.65, df = 2, p = < .01). Consistent with hypotheses, we found that in the I-priming 
condition relatively more participants gave an unusual example of clothes (N = 15, 
43%) than in the control condition (N = 11, 30%). In the control condition, in turn, 
more participants gave an unusual example (N = 11, 30%) than in the we-priming 
condition (N = 4, 11%). 
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These results show that, consistent with our hypotheses, participants whose 
personal self was activated, drew relatively more unusual examples of a motor 
vehicle and gave relatively more unusual examples of a piece of furniture, tools, 
and a piece of clothing. Conversely, participants whose social self was activated 
gave relatively more standard examples. Our hypothesis that social self-construals 
repress divergent thinking, whereas personal self-construals enhance divergent 
thinking, was thus confirmed. 
general discussion
Why do individual members of a group often come up with more unique and 
divergent ideas when working alone than when working together as a group? 
Our results show that social self-construals (“we-ness”) increase the motivation 
to be similar, and decrease the spontaneous report of divergent ideas. Conversely, 
individual self-construals (“I-ness”) increase the motivation to be different, and 
therefore increase divergent thinking. 
More specifically, in Study 1 we demonstrated that personal self-construals in-
crease the motivation to be different, independent, and alone, and decrease the 
motivation to be together, accepted and to conform. In Study 2 we demonstrated 
that personal self-construals increase divergent responses: Although not being 
asked explicitly to be different, people drew, for example, a golf cart when asked 
to draw a motor vehicle and answered “pyjamas” when asked to give an example 
of clothing. 
On the contrary, we found that social self-construals increase the motivation to 
conform, to be accepted, and together, and decrease the motivation to be inde-
pendent, different, and alone. Personal self-construals also decreased divergent 
responses: People drew a car when asked to draw a motor vehicle and answered 
“trousers” when asked to give an example of clothing.
These results show that self-construal level not only influences the way people 
respond to social information (e.g., Kühnen & Hannover, 2000; Stapel & Koomen, 
2001; Van Baaren et al., 2004), but it also influences the way people respond to non-
social information. The current findings offer further support for the conception 
that personal and social self-construals involve specific mindsets, which, when 
activated, determine the way we process information. 
LIMITATIons oF ThE currEnT ExPErIMEnTs
In this research we have argued and showed that self-construal level influences 
motivation and behavior. These results are consistent with previous research es-
tablishing the relation between mindsets and motivation (Gardner et al., 1999), 
and mindsets and behavior (Concalo & Staw, 2006; Stapel & Koomen, 2001; Van 
Baaren et al., 2004). Based upon current and past results, however, it is not yet 
clear whether motivation is a prerequisite for behavior. Whereas it has been shown 
that mindsets may influence behavior relatively automatically (see, for example, 
Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998), future re-
search has to determine whether (and, if so, in which degree) motivation mediates 
the relation between mindset and behavior.
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Furthermore, although it may seem plausible to assume that “working in 
groups” (as opposed to working alone) elicits social self-construals, in the current 
studies we did not measure self-construals as a function of group-membership. In 
previous research, however, it has been demonstrated that social self-construals 
are evoked easily when being in a group (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Furthermore, 
research on the minimal group paradigm has shown that random assignment to 
a group influences the allocation of resources in favor of the newly formed group 
(e.g., Amichai-Hamburger, 2005; Billig & Tajfel, 1973), which may be interpreted 
as an indication of a feeling of “we-ness.” These results would argue in favor of 
the assertion that a feeling of “we-ness” is relatively common in groups. Neverthe-
less, these results do not provide direct evidence that being in a group elicits social 
self-construals. In which degree a group may foster feelings of “we-ness” and with 
which results remains therefore an important question for future research.
IMPLIcATIons oF ThE currEnT FIndInGs
Following the logic of the current findings, an implication would be that people of 
collective, Eastern, societies might be less able to come up with new and unique 
ideas than people of individual, Western, societies. As politically incorrect as this 
may sound, these findings are consistent with the results of a study conducted by 
Concalo and Staw (2006), in which they showed that the manipulation of cultural 
orientation (“standing out from other people” versus “being like other people”) 
influenced group creativity. Given that “divergent thinking” is an important com-
ponent of creativity (Amabile, 1983), these results are in correspondence with the 
assumption that collectivism will indeed hinder divergent thinking. 
It is important to note, however, that this does not mean that individualism is 
“better” than collectivism. As Concalo and Staw (2006) argue, collectivistic values 
may lead to more interpersonal cooperation, which facilitates mobilizing people’s 
efforts. Even though individualistic societies may indeed be more adept at inno-
vation, collectivistic societies may be more adept at high work performance and 
efficiency. 
Also, as Gardner and colleagues (1999) have shown, depending on context, peo-
ple in both cultures construe themselves at different levels. Whereas Easterners 
may be less creative in general, they can construe themselves at a more individual-
istic level, which may then foster creativity. Whether this is indeed the case has to 
be established in future research. 
Another implication that stems from the current research is that these results 
may provide a theoretical underpinning of the proverbial wisdom that it is some-
times wise to invite outsiders to “take a fresh look” at things. Although the interna-
tional electronics company Philips (which drives on being innovative) has eleven 
locations around the world in which large numbers of professional designers and 
innovators are employed, when a new idea is needed, people from external design 
studios are sometimes invited to participate in brainstorm sessions. Based on the 
current findings, it may be argued that people who do not “belong” to an existing 
group (i.e., designers from an external design studio) and therefore may not share 
a feeling of “we-ness,” may indeed be evoked to think “differently” and come up 
with new ideas. Besides not sharing the norms of for example the “Philips-group,” 
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these individual designers may construe themselves at a personal level, which--in 
itself--promotes being different and may generate divergent, innovative thoughts.
The same logic may of course apply to many environments, including other 
businesses (“Why are outsiders sometimes better at providing solutions or coming 
up with new ideas than people who know the business from inside-out?”), science 
(“Why do outsiders sometimes have the most innovative ideas?”), arts (“Why do 
many artists and writers create their best work in relative isolation?”), and perhaps 
even personal relationships (“Why do outsiders sometimes have to indicate what 
goes wrong and provide solutions, when both partners are intelligent enough to 
be able to figure out what is happening?”). Whenever people are together and 
experience a feeling of “we-ness,” they may be at risk of not being inventive. This 
does not only mean that they will conform to social norms and therefore think 
similarly, but, as we have shown, it may block divergent, new ideas altogether.
conclusion
In the current research we showed that the subtle activation of social self-con-
struals (“we”) instigated being similar, whereas the subtle activation of personal 
self-construals (“I”) instigated being different. These results add to the impressive 
amount of answers given to the question why people in groups often come up 
with less unique and divergent ideas than they would have come up with when 
working alone, a suggestion concerning the underlying process. Simply constru-
ing the self in terms of “we” may be enough to decrease divergent thinking, even 
when no other people are around. Similarly, construing the self in terms of “I” may 
increase the spontaneous production of divergent ideas. Even though the bound-
aries of these effects have yet to be explored, the here reported findings offer a new 
and exciting look on the process of divergent thinking. 
i Versus we 377
reFerences
Adarves-Yorno, I., Postmes, T., & Haslam, 
S. A. (2006). Social identity and the 
recognition of creativity in groups. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 
479-497.
Amabile, T. M. (1983). The social psychology 
of creativity: A componential conceptu-
alization. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45, 357-378.
Amichai-Hamburger, Y. (2005). Internet mini-
mal group paradigm. CyberPsychology & 
Behavior, 8, 140-142.
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). 
Automaticity of social behavior: Direct 
effects of trait construct and stereotype 
activation on action. Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology, 71, 230-244.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The 
need to belong: Desire for interpersonal 
attachments as a fundamental human 
motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 
497-529.
Billig, M., & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categoriza-
tion and similarity in intergroup behav-
iour. European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 3, 27-52. 
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is 
this we? Levels of collective identity and 
self representations. Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology, 71, 83-93.
Camacho, L. M., & Paulus, P. B. (1995). The role 
of social anxiousness in group brain-
storming. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68, 1071-1080.
Concalo, J. A., & Staw, B. M. (2006). Individu-
alism-collectivism and group creativity. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-
sion Processes, 100, 96-109.
Diehl, M., & Stroebe, W. (1987). Productiv-
ity loss in brainstorming groups: To-
ward the solution of the riddle. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 
497-509.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Van Knippenberg, A. (1998). 
The relation between perception and be-
havior, or how to win a game of trivial 
pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 865-877.
Gardner, W. L., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. Y. (1999). 
“I” value freedom, but “we” value rela-
tionships: Self-construal priming mir-
rors cultural differences in judgment. 
Psychological Science, 10, 321-326.
Kühnen, U., & Hannover, B. (2000). Assimila-
tion and contrast in social comparisons 
as a consequence of self-construal acti-
vation. European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 30, 799-811.
Lee, A. Y., Aaker, J. L., & Gardner, W. L. (2000). 
The pleasures and pains of distinct self-
construals: The role of interdependence 
in regulatory focus. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 78, 1122-1134.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture 
and the self: Implications for cognition, 
emotion, and motivation. Psychological 
Review, 98, 224-253.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2003). Culture, 
self, and the reality of the social. Psycho-
logical Inquiry, 14, 277-283.
Mullen, B., Johnson, C., & Salas, E. (1991). Pro-
ductivity loss in brainstorming groups: 
A meta-analytic integration. Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 12, 3-23.
Nijstad, B. A., Stroebe, W., & Lodewijkx, H. F. 
M. (2003). Production blocking and idea 
generation: Does blocking interfere with 
cognitive processes? Journal of Experi-
mental Social Psychology, 39, 531-548.
Paulus, P. B., Larey, T. S., & Ortega, A. H. 
(1995). Performance and perceptions of 
brainstormers in an organizational set-
ting. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 
17, 249-265.
Stapel, D. A., & Koomen, W. (2001). I, we, and 
the effects of others on me: How self-
construal moderates social comparison 
effects. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 80, 766-781.
Van Baaren, R. B., Horgan, T. G., Chartrand, 
T. L., & Dijkmans, M. (2004). The for-
est, the trees, and the chameleon: Con-
text dependence and mimicry. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 
453-459.
